CVE Feed
5.8 Medium

filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at <path>.filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses

CVE-2026-112938

StrictSoftFileLock and AsyncStrictSoftFileLock check .filelock (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one lstat call on its name. lstat reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches .filelock/claims by pathname for every later operation (mkdir, scan, publish, link, unlink). opendirectory passes ONOFOLLOW (a flag that makes an open fail when the final name is a symbolic link), but the flag covers only the final claims component. The kernel follows a symbolic link in any earlier component. Another local user (the other user below) who can rename .filelock exchanges it for a symbolic link after the check. In a shared directory without the sticky bit (a directory flag that lets only a file's owner rename or remove it), any user with write access can do this. Where the shared directory is sticky, such as /tmp, only the user who created .filelock before the user running the lock (the lock user below) first used it can. The lock user's process (root's, if root takes the lock) then creates a claims directory and claim files (the files whose presence says a process wants or holds…

Assessment

CVSS
5.8 (v3.1)
Severity
Medium
Known exploited
Not listed in CISA KEV
Exploit availability
Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
Published
28 October 2026
Last updated
28 October 2026
Affected
pip · filelock
Weakness
CWE-363

CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

At the source

References

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